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1Abstract
This paper shows that investors ﬁnancing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of
their ﬁnancial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition
for scarce informed capital at the reﬁnancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining
positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects
funded by investors with “shallow pockets” must have not only a positive net present
value at the reﬁnancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio
projects. Our paper may help to understand provisions used in venture capital
ﬁnance that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it diﬃcult to add more capital
once the initial venture capital fund is raised.
2Venture capital ﬁnance takes place in an environment of severe informational asymmetries and
incentive problems. Venture capitalists not only must assess the quality of investment proposals
submitted to them for funding, but once the initial funding has taken place, entrepreneurs must
be given the right incentives, and the performance of portfolio companies must be monitored on
an ongoing basis. This paper departs from most of the existing literature by recognizing that
venture capitalists manage a portfolio of projects. The need for portfolio management arises if
the amount of capital–both ﬁnancial and human–available to a venture capital fund is limited,
implying that venture capitalists must carefully choose which projects to allocate their scarce
ﬁnancial and human resources to.1 By staging their investments, venture capitalists retain the
right to deny capital infusions to particular projects in favor of other, more promising ones:
“The most important mechanism for controlling the venture is staging the infusion
of capital. ... Capital is a scarce and expensive resource for individual ventures. ...
The credible threat to abandon a venture, even when the ﬁrm might be economically
viable, is the key to the relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture capi-
talist. ... The seemingly irrational act of shutting down an economically viable entity
is rational when viewed from the perspective of the venture capitalist confronted with
allocating time and capital among various projects” (Sahlman (1990)).
Allocating scarce resources to the most potent portfolio projects implies that projects eﬀec-
tively compete with one another for limited “informed” capital at the reﬁnancing stage.2 As this
naturally increases venture capitalists’ ex post bargaining power, one would expect that entre-
preneurs’ ex ante incentives are reduced. As we will show, however, the opposite may be true.
While entrepreneurs’ expected payoﬀ from a given eﬀort level is reduced (“bargaining power
eﬀect”), the diﬀerence in expected payoﬀsa c r o s se ﬀort levels may be increased (“competition
eﬀect”). Competition for scarce informed capital introduces an additional incentive to have not
only a positive net present value (NPV) at the reﬁnancing stage, but one that is higher than
that of competing portfolio projects. If the competition eﬀect outweighs the bargaining power
3eﬀect, limiting the amount of informed capital can improve entrepreneurial incentives.
This paper compares “constrained ﬁnance” (or “shallow pockets”)–i.e., committing to scarce
informed capital to induce competition among entrepreneurs–with “unconstrained ﬁnance” (or
“deep pockets”). Constrained ﬁnance may improve entrepreneurial incentives, but it also entails
allocational ineﬃciencies, as successful projects may not obtain capital at the reﬁnancing stage.
Accordingly, constrained ﬁnance should not be used for projects with a high likelihood of success.
Indeed, venture capitalists acknowledge that they “go for the home run” to oﬀset the large
number of failures in their portfolios (Sahlman (1990), Bygrave and Timmons (1992)).3
While our model focuses mainly on moral hazard, we show that constrained ﬁnance may also
have advantages in dealing with adverse selection problems. In particular, separation between
good and bad entrepreneurs may be impossible if investors have deep pockets, but possible
if investors can choose between deep and shallow pockets. For certain parameter values, the
unique equilibrium in our model is a separating equilibrium in which good entrepreneurs choose
constrained ﬁnance and bad ones choose unconstrained ﬁnance.
Evidence from venture capital funds and the partnership agreements governing them support
the notion of competition for scarce ﬁnancial and human capital among portfolio companies. As
is well known, “venture organizations will limit both how often they raise funds and the size of
the funds that they raise” (Gompers and Lerner (1996)). Moreover, while venture capitalists
raise a new fund every few years, partnership agreements often include covenants preventing
venture capitalists from co-investing in companies managed by other funds of the same venture
capitalist, implying that once a fund is raised, it cannot be easily augmented by adding more
capital (Sahlman (1990), Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1995), Gompers and Lerner (1996)).4 A
fund’s human capital is also often limited fom the outset: Partnership agreements often in-
clude covenants that restrict the ability to add more general partners–i.e., experienced venture
capitalists–to an existing fund (Gompers and Lerner (1996)).5 As a consequence, venture cap-
italists must carefully choose to which portfolio companies they allocate their scarce ﬁnancial
4and human capital, leading to precisely the sort of competition envisioned here.
Most of the theoretical literature on venture capital ﬁnance considers the ﬁnancing of a
single project. Exceptions are Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003), Bernile, Cumming, and
Lyandres (2005), and Fulghieri and Sevilir (2005), who all consider the optimal span of a venture
capitalist’s portfolio. In contrast, holding the span of the venture capitalist’s portfolio ﬁxed, we
consider the beneﬁts and costs of venture capitalists being capital constrained.
In a broader context, this paper shows that prominent arguments made in other strands
of economics are also relevant for venture capital portfolio ﬁnancing. Without trying to be
exhaustive, let us point out three important parallels.
First, in our model, a potential disadvantage of constrained ﬁnance is that it weakens en-
trepreneurs’ bargaining position, thus reducing their incentives to exert eﬀort. However, if
entrepreneurs can be motivated to exert high eﬀort, because the competition eﬀect outweighs
the bargaining power eﬀect, then this disadvantage can become an advantage: Due to the in-
vestor’s stronger bargaining position, projects that would otherwise not be ﬁnancially viable
may now become viable. The idea of strengthening the bargaining position of the party whose
contribution is relatively more important is analyzed in several papers, notably Grossman and
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Aghion and Tirole (1997), and–in a corporate ﬁnancing
context–Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994). In particu-
lar, Aghion and Bolton argue that strengthening the position of investors may render projects
ﬁnancially viable that might not be viable otherwise.
Second, the idea that competition for scarce capital may increase incentives to eﬀort (“com-
petition eﬀect”) borrows from the labor tournament literature (Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nale-
buﬀ and Stiglitz (1983)). There is one subtle qualiﬁcation: In many real-world tournaments,
prizes are exogenously given, e.g., there is only one CEO position in a ﬁrm. In contrast, our
model implies that in a context of portfolio ﬁnancing, investors can provide optimal incentives
by carefully choosing the ratio of available capital to projects.
5Third, there is an obvious parallel to the literature on soft-budget constraints, started by
Kornai (1979, 1980) in the context of socialist economies and applied by Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995) to ﬁnancial commitment problems. There is, again, a subtle but noteworthy
diﬀerence: In Dewatripont and Maskin’s model, the role of hard budget constraints is to deter
bad entrepreneurs from seeking ﬁnancing ex ante. In our model, by contrast, the role of hard
budget constraints, or shallow pockets, is to credibly commit to a tournament to elicit greater
entrepreneurial eﬀort.
The literature on internal capital markets also addresses issues similar to those in this paper.
On the positive side, internal capital markets may allow for an eﬃcient ex post reallocation of
resources, sometimes known as “winner-picking” (Stein (1997), Matsusaka and Nanda (2002)).6
On the negative side, the prospect of having resources reallocated away may weaken division
managers’ ex ante incentives (Brusco and Panunzi (2005)).7 In our model, the positive and
negative sides are reversed: Unlike in an internal capital market, the ex post resource allocation is
less eﬃcient under constrained ﬁnance, while entrepreneurs’ ex ante incentives may be improved.8
Finally, our paper relates to the capital budgeting literature, notably Harris and Raviv (1996,
1998). The authors show that imposing a ﬁxed spending limit–which can be relaxed at the
cost of a subsequent audit–may be part of an optimal capital budgeting procedure. As in our
model, it may thus be optimal to ration capital, even if doing so means foregoing positive NPV
investments. The reasons for doing so are diﬀerent, though. In Harris and Raviv’s models,
capital rationing induces truthful revelation of division managers’ private information. In our
model, capital rationing improves entrepreneurs’ ex ante incentives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model. Section 2
examines the beneﬁts and costs of constrained ﬁnance with respect to eﬀort incentives. Section 3
considers the optimal choice between constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance. Section 4 discusses
the role of ex ante and interim asymmetric information. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in
the Appendix.
61 The Model
Agents and Technology
There are two types of agents: entrepreneurs, who have no wealth, and investors. Each
entrepreneur has a project that requires an initial capital outlay of I1 > 0 at t =0 . Projects
can be reﬁnanced at t =1at cost I2 > 0. Reﬁnancing is best understood as an expansion of
the project. Projects that are not reﬁnanced continue on a smaller s c a l ei nas e n s em a d ep r e c i s e
below.9 At t =2 , each project generates a veriﬁable payoﬀ of either R>0 or zero.
At t =1 , when the reﬁnancing decision is made, a project’s “interim type” is ψ ∈ {n,l,h},
w h i c hi so n l yo b s e r v e db yt h ei n v e s t o ra n de n t r e p r e n e u r . P r o j e c t sw i t hi n t e r i mt y p eψ = n
are failures and generate a certain zero payoﬀ. Projects with interim type ψ = l or ψ = h are
successful, implying that it is eﬃcient to reﬁnance them. If a project with interim type ψ ∈ {l,h}
is reﬁnanced, the probability that it generates R is pψ, where ph >p l, implying an expected
payoﬀ of Rψ := pψR. By contrast, if a project with interim type ψ ∈ {l,h} is not reﬁnanced, the
probability that it generates R is p0, implying an expected payoﬀ of R0 := p0R.10 Hence, the
overall surplus from reﬁnancing a project with interim type ψ ∈ {l,h} is rψ := Rψ − R0 − I2,
which is positive, and where rh >r l follows from our assumption that ph >p l.
With probability 1 − τ, the project’s interim type is ψ = n, a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yτ, its
interim type is either ψ = l or ψ = h. Conditional on success, the probability of having interim
type ψ = h is qθ, and the probability of having interim type ψ = l is 1 − qθ, where θ ∈ {g,b}
represents the project’s “ex ante type.” Accordingly, the total probability that the project has
interim type ψ = h is τqθ, and the total probability that it has interim type ψ = l is τ(1 − qθ).
We assume that qg >q b, i.e., good projects have a higher probability of becoming interim type
ψ = h than do bad projects. Figure 1 summarizes the project technology.
[Figure 1 here]
We assume that entrepreneurs can choose their ex ante type at t =0 . This choice is only
7observed by the entrepreneur (“moral hazard”). Choosing ex ante type θ yields private beneﬁts
Bθ at t =2 , where Bb = B>B g =0 . These beneﬁts are only obtained if the project is
successful. As B constitutes the opportunity cost of choosing θ = g instead of θ = b, we refer to
B simply as “eﬀort cost” and to the entrepreneur’s choice of θ = g and θ = b as “high eﬀort”
and “low eﬀort”, respectively. Finally, we assume that (qg−qb)(rh−rl) >B ,implying that high
eﬀort is socially eﬃcient.
Financing
Investors compete at t =0to provide ﬁnancing to entrepreneurs. We specify that each
investor optimally provides start-up ﬁnance to two entrepreneurs.11 In principle, investors can
raise enough capital initially that at t =1 , they are able to reﬁnance all projects that are
worth reﬁnancing. The central claim of this paper, however, is that investors may sometimes
deliberately limit the amount of capital raised to create competition among entrepreneurs at the
reﬁnancing stage. As noted in the Introduction, evidence from venture capital funds and the
partnership agreements governing them supports the notion of competition for scarce ﬁnancial
and human capital envisioned here.
A priori, it is not clear why the investor would not attempt to raise additional capital at
t =1if both projects turn out to be successful, and we do not preclude the investor from trying
to do so. However, as only the (inside) investor and entrepreneur know the project’s interim
type, there exists a lemons problem vis-à-vis outside investors that may render outside ﬁnancing
infeasible, as in Rajan’s (1992) model. We relegate a formal analysis of this issue to Section 4.2.
For the time being, we assume that the lemons problem at t =1is suﬃciently strong to render
outside ﬁnancing infeasible.
The investor’s choice is between what we call unconstrained ﬁnance (or “deep pockets”) and
constrained ﬁnance (or “shallow pockets”). This choice is observable by entrepreneurs. Under
unconstrained ﬁnance, the investor raises enough capital to potentially reﬁnance both portfolio
projects at t =1 , i.e., she raises 2I1 +2 I2. Under constrained ﬁnance, in contrast, the investor
8only raises 2I1+I2 initially. Any capital currently not used is invested in liquid securities, whose
interest rate is normalized to zero.
Contracts and Renegotiations
Investors compete ex ante by oﬀering contracts specifying for each entrepreneur Ei as h a r e
si of the project’s ﬁnal payoﬀ. By restricting ourselves to sharing rules, we rule out transfer
payments to entrepreneurs that are independent of the project’s payoﬀ. The usual motivation
for this assumption is that guaranteed transfer payments independent of payoﬀs would attract
fraudulent entrepreneurs, or “ﬂy-by-night operators” (Rajan (1992)), who would only apply to
cash in the guaranteed transfer payment.12
Because the project’s interim type is non-veriﬁable, the reﬁnancing decision cannot be part
of an initial contract. Hence, whether the project will be reﬁnanced must be determined by
negotiations between the investor and entrepreneur at t =1 . As part of these negotiations,
the two parties may renegotiate the initial sharing rule si, which is why we shall use the term
renegotiations. But even though the initial sharing rule is renegotiated, it is not meaningless:
It deﬁnes the entrepreneur’s and investor’s payoﬀs if the project is not reﬁnanced, and thus
their outside options if the renegotiations break down. Where do the bargaining powers in
the renegotiations stem from? The entrepreneur’s bargaining power stems from his ability to
withdraw his inalienable and essential human capital, while the investor’s bargaining power
stems from her right to decide whether to reﬁnance.13
The assumption that the project’s interim type is non-veriﬁable is important. It implies
that the reﬁnancing decision cannot be part of an initial contract, which in turn forces the
investor and entrepreneur into a bargaining situation at the reﬁnancing stage. Evidence from the
venture capital literature supports this assumption. Gompers (1995) writes: “Each time capital
is infused, contracts are written and negotiated ... Major review of progress, due diligence, and
the decision to continue funding are generally done at the time of the reﬁnancing.” That contracts
are renegotiated at the reﬁnancing stage suggests that it might be diﬃcult to specify ex ante
9what precisely “progress” means. Indeed, Gompers (1995) rejects the alternative hypothesis of
contingent follow-up ﬁnancing based on observable “technology-driven milestones”.14 Similarly,
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) write, “we consider a ﬁnancing round as a set of contracts agreed
to on a particular date that determines the disbursements of funds from the VC to a company.
An e wﬁnancing round diﬀers from the contingent release of funds in that the price and terms
of the ﬁnancing are not set in advance” (italics added).
2R e ﬁnancing and Renegotiations
Solving the model backwards, we ﬁrst consider the renegotiations at t =1 . Subsequently, we
derive the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ at t =0 , accounting for the outcome of the renegoti-
ations. We then compute the sensitivity of the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ with respect to
his ex ante type. Comparing the sensitivities under unconstrained and constrained ﬁnance, we
ﬁnally obtain what we call the “responsiveness condition”.
2.1 Renegotiations under Unconstrained Finance
Under unconstrained ﬁnance, the investor has suﬃcient capital to reﬁnance all projects that
are worth reﬁnancing. As a result, she cannot credibly threaten not to reﬁnance a project
with interim type ψ ∈ {l,h}, regardless of the interim type of the other portfolio project.
Consequently, the reﬁnancing decision for a particular project is independent of the other project,
implying that we can analyze the renegotiations with each entrepreneur separately.
Consider the renegotiations with entrepreneur Ei. Given that the investor knows Ei’s interim
type, renegotiations take place under symmetric information. We adopt the standard alternating
oﬀers bargaining procedure with an open time horizon analyzed in Rubinstein (1982). While the
bargaining procedure is open ended, bargaining frictions ensure that an agreeement is reached
immediately. For the speciﬁc type of bargaining friction employed here, we follow Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) and assume that after each round, there is a probability δ that
10the renegotiations break down, in which case the project is not reﬁnanced.15
Without loss of generality, we assume that the investor makes the ﬁrst oﬀer, which Ei
can either accept or reject.16 The oﬀer is to provide reﬁnancing in return for a share of the
project’s payoﬀ.I fEi rejects the investor’s oﬀer, provided that negotiations have not yet broken
down, he can make a counteroﬀer, and so on. It is crucial that the entrepreneur can make
counteroﬀers. If all Ei could do is accept or reject the investor’s oﬀers, the investor could extract
the entire surplus. Ei’s continuation payoﬀ at t =1would then always be siR0 regardless of
his interim type, which in turn implies that there would be no diﬀerence between constrained
and unconstrained ﬁnance in terms of providing incentives. However, a bargaining procedure
i nw h i c ho n l yt h ei n v e s t o rc a nm a k eo ﬀers would require that she can credibly commit to not
l i s t e n i n gt oa n yo ﬀers the entrepreneur makes, which seems to be diﬃcult to implement in
practice.17
The analysis of the bargaining game is straightforward. If a project with interim type
ψi ∈ {l,h} is not reﬁnanced, it generates an expected payoﬀ of R0. Hence, if ψi ∈ {l,h} the
outside options in the renegotiations are (1 − si)R0 and siR0, respectively, while the surplus
to be bargained over is rψi. Lemma 1 characterizes the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining
game as δ → 0. The proof follows Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986).
Lemma 1. Under unconstrained ﬁnance, the investor’s and entrepreneur Ei’s continuation
payoﬀsa tt =1are as follows:
i) If Ei has interim type ψi = n, both continuation payoﬀs are zero.
ii) If Ei has interim type ψi ∈ {l,h},E i’s continuation payoﬀ is siR0 + 1
2rψi and the investor’s
continuation payoﬀ is (1 − si)R0 + 1
2rψi.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
112.2 Renegotiations under Constrained Finance
Under constrained ﬁnance, the investor cannot reﬁnance all projects that are worth reﬁnancing,
implying that she can credibly threaten to use her scarce capital for the other portfolio project.
The renegotiations with Ei thus depend on the interim type of the other entrepreneur, Ej, for
two reasons. First, who the investor picks to bargain with ﬁrst depends on who has a higher
interim type. Second, the investor’s outside option in the renegotiations with Ei depends on
Ej’s interim type, and vice versa.18
The extensive form of the bargaining game is as follows. The investor picks one of the two
entrepreneurs, say Ei, and makes him an oﬀer. If Ei accepts, the game ends. If Ei rejects, the
negotiations with Ei break down with probability δ. If there is no breakdown, Ei can make a
counteroﬀer. If the investor accepts Ei’s counteroﬀer, the game ends. If the investor rejects,
the negotiations with Ei b r e a kd o w nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yδ. If there is no breakdown, the investor
again picks one of the two entrepreneurs, and so on. In contrast, if the negotiations with Ei
have broken down, the investor must necessarily turn to Ej. Hence, the bargaining procedure is
the same alternating oﬀer procedure, with the same open time horizon and risk of breakdown,
as in the case of unconstrained ﬁnance, except that after each round, the investor can choose
with whom to bargain next.
If at least one entrepreneur has interim type ψ = n, the outcome is trivially the same as
under unconstrained ﬁnance. The interesting case is where neither entrepreneur has interim
type ψ = n. As the following lemma shows, the investor can then extract a higher continuation
payoﬀ from her ﬁrst pick, say Ei, relative to unconstrained ﬁnance. The downside is that she
cannot realize any surplus with her second pick Ej, as her scarce capital has already been used
up.
Lemma 2. Under constrained ﬁnance, the investor’s and the two entrepreneurs’ continuation
payoﬀsa tt =1are as follows:
i) If at least one entrepreneur has interim type ψ = n, all payoﬀsa r ea si nL e m m a1 .
12ii) If neither entrepreneur has interim type ψ = n, and if the investor picks Ei to bargain with
ﬁrst, then
a) Ei’s continuation payoﬀ is siR0 + 1
2(rψi − 1
2rψj),
b) Ej’s continuation payoﬀ is sjR0, and
c) the investor’s continuation payoﬀ is (1 − si)R0 +( 1− sj)R0 + 1
2(rψi + 1
2rψj).
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
If both entrepreneurs have the same interim type ψ ∈ {l,h}, the investor cannot extract the
entire surplus from her ﬁrst pick Ei even though the other entrepreneur is a perfect substitute.
This may seem surprising. Why does the investor not deviate and go to the other entrepreneur
Ej, who should be eager to obtain reﬁnancing, even under less favorable conditions, given that he
would otherwise only obtain sjR0? The reason is that Ej would not accept an oﬀer that leaves
him just a little more than his outside option payoﬀ. Instead, he would reject the investor’s
oﬀer, and make a counteroﬀer that makes the investor indiﬀerent between accepting and going
back to her ﬁrst pick Ei.
Finally, we consider the issue of who the investor picks to bargain with ﬁrst. Note that
the initial sharing rule si does not aﬀect the investor’s choice; it depends exclusively on the
entrepreneurs’ interim types. When the two interim types are not identical, the investor bargains
ﬁrst with the higher interim type. When the two interim types are identical, the investor is
indiﬀerent. In this case, we specify that she picks either of the two entrepreneurs with equal
probability (see proof of Lemma 2).
2.3 The Responsiveness Condition
Given Lemmas 1 and 2, we can compute the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ at t =0 .T h e
derivation is in the Appendix. The entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ under unconstrained ﬁnance
is
τ
½
siR0 +
1
2
[rl + qθi (rh − rl)]
¾
. (1)
13Below, we consider the entrepreneur’s eﬀort choice problem. The more responsive the entrepre-
neur’s expected payoﬀ i st oh i se xa n t et y p e ,t h ee a s i e ri ti st om o t i v a t eh i mt oc h o o s eθ = g
rather than θ = b. We obtain the responsiveness under unconstrained ﬁnance by subtracting the
entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ for θi = b from that for θi = g :
1
2
τ (qg − qb)(rh − rl). (2)
Importantly, the responsiveness does not correspond to the full diﬀerence in expected project
values as the investor can extract part of this value in the renegotiations.
Likewise, the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ under constrained ﬁnance is
τ
½
siR0 +
1
2
[rl + qθi (rh − rl)]
¾
−
τ2
8
©
rl
¡
3 − qθi + qθj
¢
+3 qθiqθj (rh − rl)
ª
. (3)
Under constrained ﬁnance, the two entrepreneurs compete for scarce informed capital. Con-
sequently, if the other entrepreneur also has a proﬁtable reﬁnancing opportunity, the investor
can extract more from a given entrepreneur than she can under unconstrained ﬁnance. Our
key insight, however, is that oﬀering constrained ﬁnance may nevertheless make an entrepre-
neur’s expected payoﬀ more responsive to his ex ante type: While the investor’s stronger ex
post bargaining position reduces the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ for a given ex ante type,
the diﬀerence in expected payoﬀs across ex ante types can be increased. As will become clear
shortly, we are interested in the case in which both entrepreneurs choose θ = g.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
we obtain the responsiveness under constrained ﬁnance by setting θj = g and subtracting the
entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ for θi = b from that for θi = g :
1
2
(qg − qb)τ
n
(rh − rl)+
τ
4
[rl − 3qg (rh − rl)]
o
. (4)
Comparing the responsiveness under unconstrained ﬁnance, (2), with that under constrained
ﬁnance, (4), establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The responsiveness of the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ to his ex ante type is
14higher under constrained ﬁnance than under unconstrained ﬁnance if and only if
rh − rl <
rl
3qg
. (5)
We will henceforth refer to (5) as the “responsiveness condition.” It captures the tradeoﬀ
between two eﬀects of competition for scarce informed capital under constrained ﬁnance:
Competition Eﬀect: Under constrained ﬁnance, not being picked ﬁrst to be bargained with
implies that the entrepreneur will not receive reﬁnancing in equilibrium. Thus, competition for
scarce informed capital introduces an additional incremental return to being picked ﬁrst, making
the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ more sensitive to his ex ante type.
Bargaining Power Eﬀect: Under constrained ﬁnance, the investor can threaten to reﬁnance
the other entrepreneur when bargaining with her ﬁrst pick. This provides the investor with
additional bargaining power, which reduces the entrepreneur’s expected return from being reﬁ-
nanced, thus reducing the responsiveness.
If the responsiveness condition (5) holds, the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ under con-
strained ﬁnance is more sensitive to his ex ante type than it is under unconstrained ﬁnance.
Put simply, constrained ﬁnance then provides stronger eﬀort incentives than does unconstrained
ﬁnance. Intuitively, unconstrained ﬁnance provides eﬀort incentives through the diﬀerence in
ﬁnal payoﬀs rh −rl = Rh −Rl (see (2)). If this diﬀerence is large, the incentives provided under
unconstrained ﬁnance are already quite substantial. Accordingly, the additional incentives under
constrained ﬁnance created through competition for scarce informed capital have relatively little
value, and the competition eﬀect is dominated by the bargaining power eﬀect. Conversely, if
rh−rl is small, the incentives provided under unconstrained ﬁnance are relatively small, and the
additional incentives under constrained ﬁnance through competition for scarce informed capital
oﬀset the negative bargaining power eﬀect. As we will show in the following section, (5) is a
necessary but not suﬃcient condition for constrained ﬁnance to be chosen.
153 Constrained versus Unconstrained Finance
3.1 Analysis
We now analyze the investor’s choice between constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance. There
are exactly two cases in which the investor will choose constrained ﬁnance: when constrained
ﬁnance is the only viable alternative, i.e., the investor can only break even under constrained
ﬁnance, and when both alternatives are viable, but constrained ﬁnance gives entrepreneurs a
higher expected payoﬀ. As there is ex ante competition for entrepreneurs, investors choose
constrained ﬁnance in this case.
It is easy to show that neither of the cases is possible if constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance
both implement the same level of eﬀort. Hence, constrained ﬁnance is chosen only if it imple-
ments higher eﬀort. That is, constrained ﬁnance must implement θ = g while unconstrained
ﬁnance must implement θ = b. By (2) and (4), this in turn implies, ﬁrst, that the responsiveness
condition (5) must hold, and second, that the eﬀort cost B must lie in the intermediate range
1
2
(qg − qb)(rh − rl) ≤ B<
1
2
(qg − qb)
n
(rh − rl)+
τ
4
[rl − 3qg (rh − rl)]
o
. (6)
The condition (6) has an intuitive interpretation.19 If eﬀort is not particularly costly, so that even
unconstrained ﬁnance can induce high eﬀort, constrained ﬁnance cannot play out its advantage
of providing relatively stronger eﬀort incentives. Conversely, if eﬀort is extremely costly so
that even constrained ﬁnance cannot induce high eﬀort, then, again, it does not matter that
constrained ﬁnance provides relatively stronger eﬀort incentives.
If the necessary conditions hold, the choice between constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance
becomes straightforward. If only constrained ﬁnance is viable–i.e., the investor can only break
even under constrained ﬁnance–then clearly, constrained ﬁnance is chosen. Likewise, if only
unconstrained ﬁnance is viable, then unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen. Finally, if constrained and
unconstrained ﬁnance are both viable, competition for entrepreneurs implies that the investor
chooses the ﬁnancing mode that gives entrepreneurs a higher expected payoﬀ.
16To see whether a project is ﬁnancially viable, we must derive the investor’s expected payoﬀ
at t =0 . The derivation is analogous to that of (1) and (3), with the addition that θi = b for
unconstrained and θi = θj = g for constrained ﬁnance (see proof of Proposition 2). As the
investor’s expected payoﬀ decreases in the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ share, the project is viable if
and only if the investor’s expected payoﬀ is non-negative at si =0 . Accordingly, the project is
viable under unconstrained ﬁnance if and only if
πI
U := τ
½
R0 +
1
2
[rl + qb (rh − rl)]
¾
≥ I1, (7)
and it is viable under constrained ﬁnance if and only if
πI
C := τ
½
R0 +
1
2
[rl + qg (rh − rl)]
¾
−
τ2
8
©
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
ª
≥ I1. (8)
If constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance are both viable, ex ante competition among in-
vestors implies that they will choose the ﬁnancing mode that is better for entrepreneurs. The
entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ in this case can be easily derived from (1) and (3), and the in-
vestors’ zero-proﬁt condition (see proof of Proposition 2). The following proposition summarizes
the investors’ optimal choice between unconstrained and constrained ﬁnance.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the responsiveness condition (5) holds and B satisﬁes (6). For
any given investment cost I1, projects whose success probability τ is suﬃciently low are not
ﬁnancially viable. For projects that are ﬁnancially viable, the following holds:
i) F o rp r o j e c t sw i t has u ﬃciently high investment cost–provided the project is ﬁnanced at all–
only unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen.
ii) For projects with low investment costs, other things equal, constrained ﬁnance is chosen if the
project’s success probability is low, and unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen if the project’s success
probability is high.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
17By Proposition 2, if either i) the responsiveness condition (5) is violated, implying that
unconstrained ﬁnance provides relatively stronger eﬀort incentives than does constrained ﬁnance,
or if ii) the eﬀort cost B is either too low or too high, so that (6) is violated, implying that
constrained and unconstrained ﬁn a n c eb o t hi m p l e m e n tt h es a m ee ﬀort, or if iii) the investment
cost is too high, then constrained ﬁnance will not be chosen.20 Conversely, if i)-iii) hold, then
constrained ﬁnance will be chosen for relatively low success probabilities, and unconstrained
ﬁnance will be chosen for relatively high success probabilities.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2. The success probability τ is depicted on the x-
axis, and the investment cost I1 is depicted on the y-axis. The vertically and horizontally
shaded areas depict all (τ,I1) combinations for which constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance are
chosen, respectively. The unshaded area depicts all (τ,I1) combinations for which the project is
not ﬁnancially viable.
Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate Proposition 2 is by ﬁxing I1 and drawing an imaginary
horizontal line originating at I1 that runs parallel to the x-axis. In Proposition 2, “ﬁxing I1”
is implied by “other things equal,” which implies that projects are only compared with respect
to their success probabilities. Holding I1 ﬁxed, the intersection of the horizontal line with the
unshaded area shows all of the success probabilities for which the project is not ﬁnancially
viable, the intersection with the vertically shaded area shows all success probabilities for which
constrained ﬁnance is chosen, and the intersection with the horizontally shaded area shows all
success probabilities for which unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen.21
[Figure 2 here]
Part i) of Proposition 2 refers to values of I1 that lie above the point where πI
U and πI
C
intersect. For such high investment costs, the project is only viable if the probability of success
is high, in which case unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen. Intuitively, for high success probabilities,
the allocational ineﬃciency induced by constrained ﬁnance–namely, that if both projects are
successful, one of them will not be reﬁnanced–weighs heavily in expected terms.
18Part ii) of Proposition 2 refers to values of I1 that lie below the intersection of πI
U and πI
C.
Holding I1 ﬁxed, the horizontal line originating at I1 intersects ﬁrst with the unshaded area, then
with the vertically shaded area, and ﬁnally with the horizontally shaded area. Projects with
relatively low success probabilities are thus ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance, while projects
with high success probabilities are ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
In Figure 2, τ = b τ marks the critical success probability at which the entrepreneur’s expected
payoﬀs under constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance intersect.22 If both ﬁnancing modes are
ﬁnancially viable, constrained ﬁnance is chosen for success probabilities τ ≤ b τ,and unconstrained
ﬁnance is chosen for success probabilities τ>b τ. In the (vertically shaded) “lens-shaped” area,
unconstrained ﬁnance is not ﬁnancially viable, implying that constrained ﬁnance is chosen also
for success probabilities τ>b τ.
Proposition 2 lends itself to two intuitive empirical implications. The ﬁr s ti st h a tp r o j e c t s
with very high investment costs should not be ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance. This state-
ment is independent of whether the two necessary conditions (5) and (6) hold. Unfortunately,
a similarly strong statement cannot be made about when projects should be ﬁnanced under
constrained ﬁnance, for two reasons: The necessary conditions (5) and (6) may not hold, and
the investment cost may be too high, so that part i) of Proposition 2 applies. However, one
can argue the converse and in some sense weaker statement that if projects are ﬁnanced under
constrained ﬁnance, then, other things equal, they must have lower success probabilities than
comparable projects ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
We conclude with a comparative statics exercise. The beneﬁto fc o n s t r a i n e dﬁnance in our
model is that it may induce high eﬀort when unconstrained ﬁnance can only induce low eﬀort.
But if the eﬃciency loss from exerting low eﬀort is relatively small, the beneﬁti sa l s os m a l l .
Intuitively, we might thus expect that constrained ﬁnance is more likely if the eﬃciency loss
from exerting low eﬀort is large, which is the case when qb–the likelihood that exerting low
eﬀort generates a high interim type ψ = h–is small. The following corollary formalizes this
19intuition.
Corollary 1. Other things equal, an increase in the eﬃciency loss from having low entrepre-
neurial eﬀort makes it more likely that constrained ﬁnance is chosen.
Given the analysis in the proof of Proposition 2, the proof of Corollary 1 is immediate. In
Figure 2, a decrease in qb shifts both b τ and πI
U to the right, thus strictly expanding the range
of success probabilities for which constrained ﬁnance is chosen.23
3.2 Empirical Implications
The ﬁrst implication summarizes a key insight of our model:
Implication 1. Other things equal, projects ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance should have
lower success probabilities than comparable projects ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
The intuition, which is at the heart of our model, is that for high success probabilities the
allocational ineﬃciency induced by constrained ﬁnance–namely, that successful projects may
n o tb er e ﬁnanced–weighs heavily in expected terms, implying that such projects are optimally
ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
Like Implication 1, the following implication has been discussed in the previous section:
Implication 2. Other things equal, projects with very high investment costs should not be ﬁ-
nanced under constrained ﬁnance.
The intuition is closely related to that of Implication 1. Projects with very high investment
costs require a high success probability to break even. But for high success probabilities, the
beneﬁts of constrained ﬁnance are outweighed by the costs.
The next empirical implication is a restatement of Corollary 1.
Implication 3. Other things equal, projects are more likely to be ﬁnanced under constrained
ﬁnance if the eﬃciency loss from having low entrepreneurial eﬀort is large.
20There are two aspects to the entrepreneurs’ eﬀort problem in our model. The ﬁrst, addressed in
Implication 3, regards the importance of entrepreneurial eﬀort–that is, what is the eﬃciency
loss from having low (instead of high) entrepreneurial eﬀort? Intuitively, if the eﬃciency loss
from having low eﬀort is small, the beneﬁts of constrained ﬁnance, namely, that it provides
relatively stronger eﬀort incentives, are also small and likely to be outweighed by the allocational
ineﬃciency associated with constrained ﬁnance.
The second aspect concerns the severity of the eﬀort problem: How costly is entrepreneurial
eﬀort? In this regard, a necessary condition for constrained ﬁnance to be chosen is that eﬀort
is suﬃciently costly. If eﬀort is not particularly costly, so that even unconstrained ﬁnance can
induce high eﬀort, constrained ﬁnance cannot play out its advantage of providing relatively
stronger eﬀort incentives. By the same token, entrepreneurial eﬀort must not be too costly. If
eﬀo r ti se x t r e m e l yc o s t l y ,s ot h a te v e nc o n s t r a i n e dﬁnance cannot induce high eﬀort, constrained
ﬁnance again loses its advantage. We thus have:
Implication 4. Projects for which inducing entrepreneurial eﬀort is either not particularly costly
or extremely costly should be ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
An immediate corollary to Implication 4 is that, other things equal, we should see that projects
ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance exhibit higher entrepreneurial eﬀort. Importantly, our model
does not predict that projects ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance should have a higher ex post
likelihood of success. While in our model constrained ﬁnance is chosen only if it induces higher
eﬀort, Implication 1 states that projects ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance should have a lower
ex ante success probability. As the two eﬀects move in opposite directions, the overall eﬀect on
the project’s ex post success likelihood remains ambiguous.
Under unconstrained ﬁnance, there is no allocational ineﬃciency: Projects rejected at the
reﬁnancing stage are always negative NPV projects. By contrast, under constrained ﬁnance,
rejected projects may have either a negative or positive NPV.
21Implication 5. Projects rejected under constrained ﬁnance should on average have a higher
NPV than do projects rejected under unconstrained ﬁnance.
It would seem that a natural corollary to Implication 5 is that projects rejected under constrained
ﬁnance should ﬁnd it easier to obtain outside ﬁnance. As Section 4.2 shows, however, this may or
may not be true. In particular, if the lemons problem that outside investors face is suﬃciently
strong, then projects rejected under constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance may both ﬁnd it
impossible to attract outside ﬁnance.
A related empirical implication concerns the likelihood that projects are rejected at the
reﬁnancing stage. Under unconstrained ﬁnance, this likelihood is simply 1 − τ. By contrast,
under constrained ﬁnance, the likelihood of rejection is strictly higher.24 Moreover, we know
from Implication 1 that projects for which constrained ﬁnance is chosen should have lower ex
ante success probabilities to begin with. As both eﬀects move in the same direction, we have:
Implication 6. Projects ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance should have a higher likelihood of
being rejected at the reﬁnancing stage than projects ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
4 Adverse Selection
This section considers the role of asymmetric information both at the ex ante and the reﬁnancing
stages. Our base model assumed that entrepreneurs can choose their ex ante type. In Section
4.1, we assume instead that ex ante types are chosen by nature, and that only the respective
entrepreneur can observe his ex ante type. Hence, we consider an adverse selection problem
instead of a moral hazard problem.
In Section 4.2, we consider the role of asymmetric information at the reﬁnancing stage. The
(inside) investor and entrepreneur know the project’s interim type, but outside investors do not.
Our base model assumes that the resulting lemons problem is suﬃciently strong to render outside
ﬁnancing at the reﬁnancing stage infeasible. We now formally show under what conditions this
22is the case. Moreover, we show that our results hold qualitatively even in cases in which outside
ﬁnancing at the reﬁnancing stage is feasible.
4.1 Ex Ante Asymmetric Information
Contrary to our base model, we now assume that the entrepreneur’s ex ante type is chosen by
nature prior to t =0 . With probability α, nature chooses θ = g, a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − α,
nature chooses θ = b. Entrepreneurs know their ex ante types, but investors do not. Hence, at
t =0 , when investors compete for entrepreneurs, the former face an adverse selection problem.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that projects are ﬁnancially viable. From our previous
analysis, we know that this is the case if the initial investment I1 is not too large.
Suppose for the moment that unconstrained ﬁnance is the only ﬁnancing mode available to
investors. We consider competitive equilibria à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). As explained
previously, the initial sharing rule si does not aﬀect the investor’s choice as to which project she
reﬁnances. Consequently, separation between ex ante types θ = g and θ = b cannot be achieved
by oﬀering a menu of initial sharing rules, as both types of entrepreneurs would strictly prefer
the highest sharing rule oﬀered. The following result is then immediate.
Lemma 3. Suppose unconstrained ﬁnance is the only ﬁnancing mode available to investors.
Then the unique competitive equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs
receive the same sharing rule regardless of their ex ante type.
We now argue that allowing investors to choose between constrained and unconstrained
ﬁnance may enable them to separate type θ = g from type θ = b entrepreneurs. Recall from
Proposition 1 that if the responsiveness condition (5) holds, the payoﬀ diﬀerential across ex ante
types is larger under constrained ﬁnance. This implies that (5) is necessary but not suﬃcient
to achieve separation across types. To achieve separation, the diﬀerence in the responsiveness
between constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance must additionally be suﬃciently large so that
separation can be achieved at suﬃciently favorable terms for type θ = g entrepreneurs. Moreover,
23the allocational ineﬃciency induced by constrained ﬁnance must not be too large. Otherwise,
investors oﬀering constrained ﬁnance will be unable to oﬀer mutually proﬁtable contracts that
can achieve separation.
In addition to these conditions, we obtain the usual condition arising in competitive screening
models that the probability α of type θ = g entrepreneurs must not be too large. The following
proposition establishes conditions under which all of the above requirements are met. As in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we restrict consideration to pure-strategy equilibria.
Proposition 3. Consider the following separating equilibrium: E n t r e p r e n e u r sw i t he xa n t e
type θ = b receive unconstrained ﬁnance, and entrepreneurs with ex ante type θ = g receive
constrained ﬁnance. Suppose the responsiveness condition (5) holds. Then this separating equi-
librium exists and is the unique competitive equilibrium if
τ ≤
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
and
α ≤ min
(
τ
8
rl − 3qg (rh − rl)
rh − rl
,
1
2
"
1 − τ
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)
#)
.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
4.2 Interim Asymmetric Information and Outside Finance
While there is perfect competition for entrepreneurs at t =0 , we have assumed that the (inside)
investor is the only source of funding at the reﬁnancing stage–that is, projects that are not
reﬁnanced by the inside investor cannot obtain reﬁnancing from outside investors. Intuitively,
the market for outside ﬁnance may shut down at the reﬁnancing stage due to a “lemons problem.”
The insiders, namely the entrepreneur and inside investor, know the project’s interim type, but
outside investors do not. If successful projects are pooled with “lemons”–i.e., projects with
24interim type ψ = n–then outside investors may be unable to make an oﬀer that can both
attract successful projects and allow the investors to break even.
We proceed as follows. First, we show that there is always an equilibrium in which the
market for outside ﬁnance shuts down at the reﬁnancing stage, validating the assumption in our
base model. Second, to the extent that there is also an equilibrium in which outside ﬁnance
is feasible, we show that our results hold qualitatively. The inside investor is then no longer
the only potential provider of capital at the reﬁnancing stage, but she is still the only provider
of informed capital, as only she, but no outside investor, knows the project’s interim type.
Accordingly, outside ﬁnance commands a lemons premium, providing the inside investor (again)
with a strong bargaining position: While projects do not compete for scarce capital at the
reﬁnancing stage, they now compete for cheaper (informed) capital.
For a lemons problem to exist at the reﬁnancing stage, type ψ = n projects must have an
incentive to seek outside ﬁnance. Otherwise, the pool of projects seeking outside ﬁnance would
consist only of positive NPV projects. In our model thus far, insiders do not strictly beneﬁtf r o m
luring outside investors into reﬁnancing a type ψ = n project. But they do if we change our
model as follows: Suppose type ψ = n projects, instead of having a zero success probability, have
a small but positive probability pn of generating R>0. If pn is small, reﬁnancing a type ψ = n
project remains a negative NPV investment.25 Most importantly, this modiﬁcation has no eﬀect
on our previous results. In particular, the renegotiatons between the entrepreneur and the inside
investor remain exactly the same: There is still no reﬁnancing of type ψ = n projects by the
inside investor, and type ψ = n projects still generate a zero payoﬀ if they are not reﬁnanced.
However, the insiders now strictly beneﬁt from luring outside investors into reﬁnancing a type
ψ = n project: They have nothing to lose, but they may gain R − D with probability pn.
The market for outside ﬁnance at t =1operates as follows. Projects, represented by the
insiders, express their willingness to seek outside ﬁnance. Outside investors then compete to
provide funds I2 in return for a share D ≤ R of the project’s payoﬀ.26 Given the modiﬁcation
25introduced above, the insiders now strictly prefer to seek outside ﬁnance for unsuccessful projects.
In contrast, the insiders may have something to lose from seeking costly outside ﬁnance for
successful projects. As successful projects are pooled with lemons, outside ﬁnance may only
be available at unfavorable terms. If these terms are suﬃciently unfavorable, the insiders may
prefer not to reﬁnance a successful project–thus realizing R0–instead of seeking costly outside
ﬁnance. Formally, the insiders will seek outside ﬁnance for a type ψ ∈ {l,h} project if and only
if
λψ := pψ(R − D) − R0 ≥ 0. (9)
The diﬀerence
rψ − λψ = pψR − I2 − pψ(R − D)=pψD − I2
represents the lemons premium associated with costly outside ﬁnance. If there was no asym-
metric information vis-à-vis outsiders, the insiders could always obtain funds I2 in return for
ar e p a y m e n tF = I2/pψ, realizing an expected payoﬀ of pψ(R − F)=pψR − I2. If there is
asymmetric information, however, outside investors will demand a higher repayment D>Fdue
to the possibility of ﬁnancing a lemon.
Our equilibrium concept is that of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which outside in-
vestors rationally anticipate which projects seek outside ﬁnance. Given these rational beliefs,
outside investors compete themselves down to zero proﬁts. The following result characterizes
all (pure-strategy) equilibria under constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance.
Proposition 4. Under unconstrained ﬁnance, the market for outside ﬁnance at the reﬁnancing
stage shuts down completely. Likewise, under constrained ﬁnance, there is always an equilibrium
in which the market for outside ﬁnance shuts down. Depending on τ, there may exist two addi-
tional equilibria under constrained ﬁnance: If τ is suﬃciently large, there exists an equilibrium
in which all three interim types have access to costly outside ﬁnance at the reﬁnancing stage,
while if τ lies in some intermediate range, there exists an equilibrium in which only interim
types ψ ∈ {n,h} have access to costly outside ﬁnance.
26Proof. See Appendix. ¥
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is straightforward. Given that any oﬀer that outside
investors make also attracts all lemons, outside investors must set D relatively high to break even.
Outside ﬁnance thus involves a lemons premium, which makes it costly. Under unconstrained
ﬁnance, the inside investor has suﬃcient funds to reﬁnance all successful projects. There is
thus no need to draw on costly outside ﬁnance. This implies that the only projects seeking
outside ﬁnance are lemons, which in turn implies that the market for outside ﬁnance shuts
down. Likewise, under constrained ﬁnance, there is always an equilibrium in which the market
for outside ﬁnance shuts down. Irrespective of τ or other parameter values, if outside investors
believe that only lemons seek outside ﬁnance, then outside ﬁnance becomes infeasible. This
validates the assumption in our base model that the only source of funding at the interim stage
i st h ei n s i d ei n v e s t o r .
But Proposition 4 also shows that, at least for certain parameter values, there may be addi-
tional equilibria under constrained ﬁnance in which outside ﬁnance is feasible at the reﬁnancing
stage.27 Arguably, since outside ﬁnance commands a lemons premium, the inside investor will
always ﬁnd it optimal to use up her capital of I2 to reﬁnance one of the two projects (unless
both are failures, of course). But if outside ﬁnance is feasible, then the other project may also
be reﬁnanced–depending on the project’s interim type, of course–implying that inside and
outside ﬁnance may coexist at the reﬁnancing stage.
Given that there may be an equilibrium in which projects that are not reﬁnanced by the
inside investor have access to outside ﬁnance, it is important to check whether our previous
results hold qualitatively if outside ﬁnance is costly but feasible. For the sake of brevity, we only
consider the equilibrium in Proposition 4 in which all three interim types have access to costly
outside ﬁnance. It is easy to verify that qualitatively similar results obtain regarding the other
equilibrium in which only type ψ = n and type ψ = h projects have access to costly outside
ﬁnance. The following proposition establishes the analogue of the responsiveness condition (5)
27for the case in which outside ﬁnance is costly but feasible.
Proposition 5. Consider the equilibrium in Proposition 4 in which all three interim types have
access to costly outside ﬁnance at the reﬁnancing stage. Given this equilibrium, the responsive-
ness of the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ to his ex ante type is higher under constrained ﬁnance
than under unconstrained ﬁnance if and only if
(rh − λh) − (rl − λl) <
rl − λl
3qg
. (10)
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
The responsiveness condition is now expressed in terms of the lemon premium rψ−λψ, as the
insiders now bargain over the cost savings from using cheaper informed capital at the reﬁnancing
stage. Most importantly, the responsiveness condition retains its basic qualitative structure from
Proposition 1. This points to the crucial driver behind the responsiveness condition: There must
be a beneﬁtt ob e i n gr e ﬁnanced by the inside investor. This implies that there will be a beneﬁt
to being a high interim type, which in turn implies a beneﬁtt oe x e r t i n gh i g he ﬀort. Whether this
beneﬁta r i s e sb e c a u s en o tb e i n gr e ﬁnanced by the inside investor means not being reﬁnanced at
all, as in our base model, or whether it arises because not being reﬁnanced by the inside investor
means a lower surplus due to the use of costly outside ﬁnance, as above, is irrelevant for our
model’s central argument.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that investors ﬁnancing a portfolio of investment projects may use the depth
of their ﬁnancial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial agency problems. Limiting the amount
of capital allows investors to credibly commit to a tournament among portfolio projects for
(cheaper) informed capital at the reﬁnancing stage. While this improves the investor’s ex post
bargaining position, thus reducing the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ, it may nevertheless also
28improve the entrepreneur’s incentives. This is because projects funded by investors with scarce
capital must have not only a positive NPV at the reﬁnancing stage, but one that is higher than
that of competing portfolio projects. As a consequence, committing to “shallow” pockets may
be optimal despite the allocational ineﬃciency when positive NPV projects are not reﬁnanced.
Committing to shallow pockets (or “constrained ﬁnance”) may have also beneﬁts in dealing
with adverse selection problems. If all investors have deep pockets (“unconstrained ﬁnance”),
it may be impossible to separate good from bad entrepreneurs. If investors can choose between
constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance, however, such separation may be possible. In the sepa-
rating equilibrium in question, bad entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance, and
good ones are ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance.
Our model lends itself to several testable implications. A key implication of our model is that,
other things equal, projects ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance should have lower ex ante success
probabilities than comparable projects ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance. The intuition,
which lies at the heart of our model, is that for high success probabilities, the allocational
ineﬃciency induced by constrained ﬁnance weighs heavily in expected terms, implying that such
projects are better ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance. The same intuition holds for projects
with high investment costs, as such projects require a high probability of success to be ﬁnancially
viable. On the other hand, the main beneﬁto fc o n s t r a i n e dﬁnance in our model is that it may
provide stronger eﬀort incentives to entrepreneurs. Hence, another empirical implication is that
constrained ﬁnance should be more likely if the eﬃciency loss from having low entrepreneurial
eﬀort is large.
29Figure Legends
Figure 1: Summary of Project Technology. In the ﬁgure, τ denotes the probability that
the project is successful, meaning it has interim type ϕ ∈ {l,h}, and 1−τ denotes the probability
that the project fails, meaning it has interim type ϕ = n. Conditional on being successful, the
probability that the project has interim type ϕ = h (ϕ = l)i sqθ (1−qθ), where θ ∈ {g,b} denotes
the project’s ex ante type. A successful project that is reﬁnanced (not reﬁnanced) generates an
expected payoﬀ of Rϕ (R0), while a project that fails generates a certain zero payoﬀ.
Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2. In the ﬁgure, πI
U represents the investor’s ex-
pected gross payoﬀ under unconstrained ﬁnanced as deﬁn e di n( 7 ) ,πI
C represents the investor’s
expected gross payoﬀ under constrained ﬁnanced as deﬁn e di n( 8 ) ,I1 represents the project’s ex
ante investment cost, and τ represents the project’s probability of success. The entrepreneur’s
expected payoﬀ is larger (smaller) under constrained ﬁnance if τ<b τ (if τ>b τ). The vertically
(horizontally) shaded area depicts all combinations of I1 and τ for which constrained (uncon-
strained) ﬁnance is chosen. The non-shaded area depicts all combinations of I1 and τ for which
the project is not ﬁnancially viable.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Claim i) is obvious. As for claim ii), denote by yi := (1 − si)R0
and zi := siR0 the investor’s and Ei’s continuation payoﬀs, respectively, if the project is not
reﬁnanced, and by vi := Rψi − I2 and wi := vi − (yi + zi)=rψi their combined continuation
payoﬀs and the net surplus, respectively, from reﬁnancing a project with interim type ψi ∈ {l,h}.
Given that the proof is standard, we shall be brief. We characterize oﬀers by the continuation
payoﬀ X which the oﬀer leaves to Ei. The investor always oﬀers XI, while Ei always oﬀers XE.
If the investor must respond to Ei’s oﬀer, she accepts any XE satisfying
vi − XE ≥ δyi +( 1− δ)(vi − XI). (11)
The right-hand side in (11) represents the investor’s payoﬀ from rejecting Ei’s oﬀer: With
probability δ, the negotiations with Ei break down, and the investor receives yi. If negotiations
do not break down, the investor makes her counteroﬀer XI. Similarly, if Ei must respond to the
investor’s oﬀer, he accepts any XI satisfying
XI ≥ δzi +( 1− δ)XE. (12)
As usual, oﬀers along the equilibrium path must make the counterparty indiﬀerent to ac-
cepting and rejecting, implying that (11)-(12) must hold with equality. Solving (11) for XE and
inserting the result in (12), we have
XI =
δzi +( 1− δ)δ(vi − yi)
δ(2 − δ)
, (13)
which Ei accepts immediately.
By L’Hôpital’s rule, Ei’s equilibrium continuation payoﬀ as δ → 0 is
lim
δ→0
XI =
vi − yi + zi
2
= zi +
wi
2
= siR0 +
rψi
2
, (14)
implying that the investor’s equilibrium continuation payoﬀ as δ → 0 is
lim
δ→0
vi − XI = vi − zi −
wi
2
= yi +
wi
2
=( 1− si)R0 +
rψi
2
.
31Note that the same equilibrium continuation payoﬀs would obtain if, instead of solving for
XI, we solved for XE and took the limit as δ → 0,i . e . ,limδ→0 XI =l i m δ→0 XE. Consequently,
instead of letting the investor make the ﬁrst oﬀer, we could have assumed that Ei makes the
ﬁrst oﬀer; the equilibrium continuation payoﬀs are identical. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Claim i) is obvious. As for claim ii), we use the same notation as in the
proof of Lemma 1, except that we use subscripts i and j to distinguish between Ei and Ej. If
ψi ∈ {l,h},ψ j ∈ {l,h}, and ψi 6= ψj, we specify that the investor picks the entrepreneur with
the higher interim type. Without loss of generality, we assume that this is Ei. We conﬁrm below
that this strategy on the part of the investor is optimal. If ψi = ψj, the investor is indiﬀerent. In
this case, we specify that the investor randomly picks an entrepreneur (with equal probability),
with whom she then bargains until there is either a breakdown or an agreement.28 Again without
loss of generality, we assume that this is Ei.
Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1, the investor always oﬀers xI
i and accepts any counteroﬀer
xE
i that satisﬁes
vi − xE
i + yj ≥ δ(yi + vj − XI
j)+( 1− δ)(yj + vi − xI
i). (15)
In (15), XI
j denotes the investor’s oﬀer to Ej if he is the only entrepreneur present, i.e., if the
negotiations with Ei have broken down. We already know from Lemma 1 what this oﬀer is
going to be. In contrast, xE
i and xI
i denote Ei’s and the investor’s oﬀers, respectively, if both
entrepreneurs are still present. Note the diﬀerence to (11): If the investor accepts Ei’s oﬀer,
she realizes, in addition to (vi − xE
i ), also her outside option payoﬀ yj with Ej, whose project
is not reﬁnanced. By contrast, if the investor rejects Ei’s oﬀer, the negotiations with Ei break
down with probability δ, in which case she continues with Ej. Finally, if the negotiations with
Ei do not break down, the investor makes her counteroﬀer xI
i. As for Ei, he always oﬀers xE
i
and accepts any counteroﬀer xI
i satisfying
xI
i ≥ δzi +( 1− δ)xE
i . (16)
32Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1, (15)-(16) must hold with equality. Solving (15) for xE
i
and inserting the result in (16), we obtain
xI
i =
δzi +( 1− δ)δ(vi − yi + yj − vj + XI
j)
δ(2 − δ)
, (17)
which Ei accepts immediately.
Analogous to (14), we obtain limδ→0 XI
j = zj + wj/2. Using L’Hôpital’s rule, we thus have
that Ei’s equilibrium continuation payoﬀ as δ → 0 is
lim
δ→0
xI
i =
vi − yi −
wj
2 + zi
2
= zi +
1
2
(wi −
wj
2
)
= siR0 +
1
2
(rψi −
rψj
2
),
which implies that the investor’s total equilibrium continuation payoﬀ (i.e., including her outside
option payoﬀ yj realized with Ej)a sδ → 0 is
vi − zi −
1
2
(wi −
wj
2
)+yj = yi +
1
2
(wi +
wj
2
)+yj
=( 1 − si)R0 +( 1− sj)R0 +
1
2
(rψi +
rψj
2
).
As in the proof of Lemma 1, we could have equally solved for xE
i and taken the limit as δ → 0;
the equilibrium continuation payoﬀs are identical.
It remains to show that if both entrepreneurs are still present and ψi 6= ψj, the investor does
not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate and make an oﬀer to the entrepreneur with the lower interim
type, Ej. Suppose the investor deviates and oﬀers xI
j to Ej while accepting any xE
j that satisﬁes
vj − xE
j + yi ≥ δ(yj + vi − XI
i )+( 1− δ)(yj + vi − xI
i). (18)
In (18), if the investor rejects Ej’s oﬀer and the negotiations with Ej break down, the investor
must necessarily switch back to Ei. However, the investor also switches back to Ei if the nego-
tiations with Ej did not break down.29 As for Ej, he oﬀers xE
j and accepts any xI
j satisfying
xI
j ≥ δzj +( 1− δ)xE
j . (19)
33As previously, (18)-(19) must hold with equality. Solving (18) for xE
j and inserting the result
in (19) yields
xI
j = δzj +( 1− δ)(vj + yi − yj − vi + δXI
i +( 1− δ)xI
i). (20)
To conﬁrm that the investor does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate, we must show that
vi − xI
i + yj ≥ vj − xI
j + yi. (21)
Inserting xI
j from (20) into (21) and rearranging, (21) becomes
δzj − δ(vj + yi − yj − vi)+( 1− δ)δXI
i ≥ xI
iδ(2 − δ). (22)
Next, inserting (17) into (22), dividing through by δ, and rearranging, (22) becomes
(1 − δ)(XI
i − XI
j) ≥ (zi − zj) − δ(vi − yi + yj − vj). (23)
Note that from (13) we have that
XI
i =
δzi +( 1− δ)δ(vi − yi)
δ(2 − δ)
and
XI
j =
δzj +( 1− δ)δ(vj − yj)
δ(2 − δ)
.
Finally, inserting XI
i and XI
j into (23), multiplying through by δ(2 − δ), and rearranging, (23)
becomes
δ[(vi − yi − zi) − (vj − yj − zj)] = δ(wi − wj)=δ(rψi − rψj) ≥ 0,
which holds by assumption. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .It remains to derive (1) and (3). Consider ﬁrst the derivation of (1).
Under unconstrained ﬁnance, the probabilities of having interim type ψ = n, ψ = l, and ψ = h
are 1 − τ, τ(1 − qθi), and τqθi, respectively. Multiplying these probabilities with the respective
continuation payoﬀs from Lemma 1 and rearranging yields (1).
34Consider next the derivation of (3). Given that the investor picks the entrepreneur with the
higher interim type ﬁrst, and if she indiﬀerent, she picks each of the two entrepreneurs with
equal probability (see Proof of Lemma 2), Lemma 2 implies the following expected continuation
payoﬀsa tt =1for Ek, an arbitrary entrepreneur: zero if ψk = n, skR0 if ψk = l and ψj6=k = h,
skR0 + 1
2(rh − 1
2rl) if ψk = h and ψ
j6=k = l, skR0 + 1
2rψk if ψk ∈ {l,h} and ψ
j6=k = n, and
skR0 + 1
8rψ if ψk = ψ
j6=k = ψ ∈ {l,h}. Multiplying these expected continuation payoﬀsw i t h
the respective joint probabilities for interim types (ψi,ψj) and rearranging yields (3). The
respective joint probabilities are τ2qθiqθj for (h,h),τ 2(1 − qθi)(1 − qθj) for (l,l), (1 − τ)2 for
(n,n),τ (1 − qθi)(1 − τ) for (l,n),τ (1 − qθj)(1 − τ) for (n,l),τ q θi(1 − τ) for (h,n),τ q θj(1 − τ)
for (n,h),τ 2qθi(1 − qθj) for (h,l), and τ2qθj(1 − qθi) for (l,h). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Analogous to the derivation of (1) and (3) in the proof of Proposition
1, we can derive the investor’s expected payoﬀ at t =0 . Under unconstrained ﬁnance, the
investor’s expected payoﬀ at t =0is
τ
½
(1 − si)R0 +
1
2
[rl + qθi (rh − rl)]
¾
− I1, (24)
and under constrained ﬁnance, it is
τ
½
(1 − si)R0 +
1
2
[rl + qθi (rh − rl)]
¾
−
τ2
8
©¡
1+3 qθj − 3qθi
¢
rl + qθiqθj (rh − rl)
ª
− I1. (25)
If (5) and (6) hold, we have θi = b i nt h ec a s eo fu n c o n s t r a i n e dﬁnance and θi = θj = g in the
case of constrained ﬁnance. Accordingly, (24) and (25) become
τ
½
(1 − si)R0 +
1
2
[rl + qb (rh − rl)]
¾
− I1 (26)
and
τ
½
(1 − si)R0 +
1
2
[rl + qg (rh − rl)]
¾
−
τ2
8
©
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
ª
− I1, (27)
respectively. Setting si =0in (26) and (27), respectively, we obtain πI
U − I1 and πI
C − I1 as
deﬁned in (7) and (8) in the main text.
35We next derive the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ at t =0if the project is ﬁnancially
viable and investors compete themselves down to zero proﬁts. Setting (26) and (27) equal to
zero, solving for si, and inserting the result in (1) (with θi = b) and (3) (with θi = θj = g),
respectively, we have that Ei’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ under unconstrained ﬁnance is
πE
U − I1 := τ
©
R0 + rl + qb (rh − rl)+B
ª
− I1, (28)
and his equilibrium expected payoﬀ under constrained ﬁnance is
πE
C − I1 := τ
©
R0 + rl + qg (rh − rl)
ª
−
τ2
2
©
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
ª
− I1. (29)
We ﬁnally establish the functional properties of πI
U,π I
C,π E
U, and πE
C. Once these properties
have been established, the rest of the proof is trivial. By inspection, πI
U and πE
U are both linear
and strictly increasing in τ. Moreover, both are zero at τ =0 , and πE
U lies strictly above πI
U for
all τ>0.30 Likewise, it is easily shown that πI
C and πE
C are both strictly concave, increasing in
τ, and zero at τ =0 .N o t et h a t
lim
τ→0
dπE
C
dτ
− lim
τ→0
dπE
U
dτ
=( qg − qb)(rh − rl) − B>0,
where the inequality follows from our assumption that θ = g is socially optimal. Hence, πE
C lies
strictly above πE
U for small τ,i m p l y i n gt h a ti tc r o s s e sπE
U exactly once from the left. In Figure
2, this intersection point is denoted by b τ. Straightforward calculations show that
b τ := 2
(qg − qb)(rh − rl) − B
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
< 1,
where the inequality follows from 2(qg − qb)(rh − rl) <r l + q2
g (rh − rl).31 Likewise, note that
lim
τ→0
dπI
C
dτ
− lim
τ→0
dπI
U
dτ
=
1
2
(qg − qb)(rh − rl) > 0,
which establishes that πI
C lies strictly above πI
U for small τ,i m p l y i n gt h a ti tc r o s s e sπI
U ex-
actly once from the left as depicted in Figure 2. Denote the intersection of πI
C and πI
U by e τ.
Straightforward calculations show that
e τ := 4
(rh − rl)(qg − qb)
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
> b τ.
36Associated with e τ is a critical value of I1, which is equal to the value of πI
U (or, equivalently,
the value of πI
C)a tτ = e τ. Denote this critical value by e I1. From (7), we have that
e I1 := e τ
½
R0 +
1
2
[rl + qb (rh − rl)]
¾
. (30)
Case i) of Proposition 2 then holds for I1 > e I1 w h i l ec a s ei i )h o l d sf o rI1 ≤ e I1. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Denote by sC and sU the equilibrium sharing rules oﬀered by
constrained and unconstrained investors, respectively. A separating equilibrium in which type
θ = g entrepreneurs prefer constrained ﬁnance and type θ = b entrepreneurs prefer unconstrained
ﬁnance exists if i) sC and sU are incentive compatible, ii) the investors’ and entrepreneurs’
participation constraints hold, and iii) there exists no other oﬀer that can break the proposed
separating equilibrium. We now address each of these three conditions in turn.
Consider incentive compatibility ﬁrst. In the proposed equilibrium, unconstrained investors
attract only type θ = b entrepreneurs and make zero proﬁts. Setting (24) with θi = b and
si = sU equal to zero and solving for sU, we obtain
sU =1+
1
2
rl + qb (rh − rl)
R0 −
I1
τR0. (31)
Consider next sC. Incentive compatibility for type θ = b entrepreneurs requires that constrained
investors oﬀer sC such that type θ = b entrepreneurs weakly prefer unconstrained ﬁnance.
Consequently, sC must satisfy32
τ
½
sUR0 +
1
2
[rl + qb (rh − rl)]
¾
≥ τ
½
sCR0 +
1
2
[rl + qb (rh − rl)]
¾
−
τ2
8
{rl (3 − qb + qg)+3 qbqg (rh − rl)},
which becomes
sC ≤ sU +
τ
8
rl (3 − qb + qg)+3 qbqg (rh − rl)
R0 , (32)
where sU is deﬁn e di n( 3 1 ) .
37Incentive compatibility for type θ = g entrepreneurs requires that they weakly prefer con-
strained ﬁnance:33
τ
½
sCR0 +
1
2
[rl + qg (rh − rl)]
¾
−
3τ2
8
©
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
ª
≥ τ
½
sUR0 +
1
2
[rl + qg (rh − rl)]
¾
,
which becomes
sC ≥ sU +
3τ
8
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
R0 . (33)
By inspection, (32) and (33) can be jointly satisﬁed if and only if rl
3qg >r h − rl, i.e., if and only
if the responsiveness condition (5) holds.
Consider next the participation constraints. The entrepreneurs’ expected payoﬀ is always
non-negative, while sU was constructed such that unconstrained investors break even. From
(25) with θi = θj = g and si = sC, we have that the expected payoﬀ of constrained investors is
non-negative if
τ
½
(1 − sC)R0 +
1
2
[rl + qg (rh − rl)]
¾
−
τ2
8
©
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
ª
− I1 ≥ 0,
which becomes
sC ≤ sU +
1
2
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)
R0 −
τ
8
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
R0
. (34)
This condition is compatible with (33) if
sU +
1
2
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)
R0 −
τ
8
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
R0
≥ sU +
3τ
8
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
R0 ,
which becomes
τ ≤
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
.
Finally, existence of the proposed separating equilibrium requires that there exists no other–
in this case: pooling–oﬀer that can break the separating equilibrium and allows investors to
break even. Analogous to (31), the zero-proﬁtp o o l i n go ﬀer is given by
sP =1+
1
2
rl +( αqg +( 1− α)qb)(rh − rl)
R0 −
I1
τR0.
38For type θ = g entrepreneurs to prefer sC to sP,i tm u s th o l dt h a t
τ
½
sCR0 +
1
2
[rl + qg (rh − rl)]
¾
−
3τ2
8
©
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
ª
≥ τ
½
sPR0 +
1
2
[rl + qg (rh − rl)]
¾
,
which becomes
sC ≥ sP +
3τ
8
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
R0 . (35)
Condition (35) is compatible with (32) if
sU +
τ
8
rl (3 − qb + qg)+3 qgqb (rh − rl)
R0 ≥ sP +
3τ
8
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
R0 ,
which becomes
α ≤
τ
8
rl − 3qg (rh − rl)
rh − rl
.
Likewise, (35) is compatible with the zero-proﬁt constraint (34) if
sU +
1
2
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)
R0 −
τ
8
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
R0
≥ sP +
3τ
8
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
R0 ,
which becomes
α ≤
1
2
"
1 − τ
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)
#
.
Finally, if the above conditions hold, any candidate pooling equilibrium can be broken by the
separating oﬀers sU and sC, which establishes uniqueness. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .The argument for why under unconstrained ﬁnance the market for
outside ﬁnance shuts down at t =1has been given in the main text. Consider next constrained
ﬁnance. By (9), if interim type ψ = l weakly prefers to seek outside ﬁnance, then interim
type ψ = h strictly prefers to seek outside ﬁnance. This immediately implies that we have three
equilibrium candidates under constrained ﬁnance: (i) no project has access to outside ﬁnance,
(ii) all three interim types have access to outside ﬁnance, and (iii) only interim types ψ = n
and ψ = h have access to outside ﬁnance. Importantly, there cannot exist an equilibrium in
which only interim types ψ = n and ψ = l have access to outside ﬁnance at t =1 ,a n dt h e r e
39obviously cannot exist an equilibrium in which only successful projects have access to outside
ﬁnance: Any oﬀer that attracts successful projects also attracts all lemons. We now consider all
three candidate equilibria in turn.
Equilibrium in which no project has access to outside ﬁnance at the reﬁnancing stage
This is trivially always an equilibrium. If outside investors believe that only lemons seek
outside ﬁnance, the market for outside ﬁnance shuts down completely.
Equilibrium in which all three interim types have access to outside ﬁnance
We ﬁrst characterize outside investors’ rational beliefs, which we denote by π(ψ).I n t h e
proposed equilibrium, there is exactly one project seeking outside ﬁnance in every state of na-
ture.34 With probability τ2qθiqθj, both projects have interim type ψ = h. Hence, the conditional
probability that the project seeking outside ﬁnance has interim type ψ = h is π(h)=τ2qθiqθj.
Likewise, with probability 1 − τ2, at least one project has interim type ψ = n. The conditional
probability that the project seeking outside ﬁnance has interim type ψ = n is thus π(n)=1−τ2.
Finally, with probability τ2(1−qθiqθj), at least one project has interim type ψ = l and no project
has interim type ψ = n. The conditional probability that the project seeking outside ﬁnance has
interim type ψ = l is thus π(l)=τ2(1 − qθiqθj).35
Given these beliefs, the zero-proﬁtr e p a y m e n tD required by outside investors is
D =
I2
τ2qθiqθjph + τ2(1 − qθiqθj)pl +( 1− τ2)pn
. (36)
The proposed equilibrium exists if i) interim types ψ = l and ψ = h weakly prefer outside
ﬁnance, and ii) there exists a repayment D ≤ R satisfying (36). By our previous arguments,
if interim type ψ = l weakly prefers outside ﬁnance, then interim type ψ = h strictly prefers
outside ﬁnance. Hence, the proposed equilibrium exists if and only if (36) and
pl(R − D) ≥ R0 (37)
hold. Note that (37) implies that D<R .Inserting (36) into (37) and rearranging, we obtain
40the requirement that
τ2 ≥
µ
plI2
plR − R0 − pn
¶µ
1
qθiqθj(ph − pl)+pl − pn
¶
, (38)
which implies that for an equilibrium to exist in which all three interim types have access to
costly outside ﬁnance, τ must be suﬃciently large.36
Equilibrium in which only interim types ψ = n and ψ = h have access to outside ﬁnance
In this equilibrium, there is exactly one project seeking outside ﬁnance if either both projects
have interim type ψ = h, or if at least one project has interim type ψ = n. Hence, the conditional
probability that the project seeking outside ﬁnance has interim type ψ = l is π(l)=0 , the
conditional probability that it has interim type ψ = h is π(h)=τ2qθiqθj/[(1−τ2)+τ2qθiqθj], and
the conditional probability that it has interim type ψ = n is π(n)=( 1−τ2)/[(1−τ2)+τ2qθiqθj].
Given these beliefs, the zero-proﬁtr e p a y m e n tD required by outside investors is
D =
I2
ξ (τ)
, (39)
where
ξ (τ): =
τ2qθiqθjph +( 1− τ2)pn
τ2qθiqθj +1− τ2
is strictly increasing in τ with limτ→0 ξ (τ)=pn and limτ→1 ξ (τ)=ph.
The proposed equilibrium exists if i) interim type ψ = h weakly prefers outside ﬁnance, ii)
interim type ψ = l prefers no reﬁnancing to outside ﬁnance, and iii) there exists a repayment
D ≤ R satisfying (39). Hence, the proposed equilibrium exists if and only if (39) and
ph (R − D) ≥ R0 >p l (R − D) (40)
hold. Note that the ﬁrst inequality implies that D<R . Inserting (39) with equality into (40),
we obtain
ph
µ
R −
I2
ξ (τ)
¶
≥ R0 >p l
µ
R −
I2
ξ (τ)
¶
.
Because rψ := pψR − R0 − I2 > 0 for ψ ∈ {l,h}, the second inequality is violated if ξ (τ) ≥ pl.
Given that ξ (τ) is increasing in τ,this implies that τ must not be too large. On the other hand,
41given that limτ→0 ξ (τ)=pn and our assumption that pn is small, the ﬁrst inequality is violated
if τ is suﬃciently small. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . As in Section 2.2, we ﬁrst derive the entrepreneurs’ continuation
payoﬀsa tt =1under constrained ﬁnance. The basic structure of the bargaining game is the
same as in Section 2.2, so we conﬁne ourselves to reporting the equilibrium continuation payoﬀs
as δ → 0. The main diﬀerence to our base model concerns the insiders’ total payoﬀ if a project
is not reﬁnanced by the inside investor. In our base model, this payoﬀ was zero for projects with
interim type ψ = n and R0 for projects with interim type ψ ∈ {l,h}. Now, given that projects
have access to costly outside ﬁnance, the insiders’ total payoﬀ if the project is not reﬁnanced by
t h ei n s i d ei n v e s t o ri sλψ := pψ(R−D) for all three interim types, where, unlike our base model,
it now holds that pn > 0. The only exception is when both projects have interim type ψ = n :
As only one project can be presented to outside investors, the insiders’ total payoﬀ in this case
is λn from the project presented to outside investors and zero from the other project.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which ψi = ψj = n. If Ej is the last entrepreneur to be bargained
with, Ej and the investor each realize 1
2λn. Consider next the negotiations with Ei,w h ot h e
investor picks ﬁrst. As the investor can credibly threaten to present Ej’s project to the outside
investors instead, equilibrium continuation payoﬀs are, analogous to Lemma 2, 1
2(λn − 1
2λn)=
1
4λn for Ei and zero for Ej.
Consider next the case in which ψi ∈ {l,h} and ψj = n. By optimality (see proof of Lemma
2), the investor bargains ﬁrst with Ei. Moreover, if the negotiations with Ei break down, it is
optimal to present Ei’s project to the outside investors, not Ej’s.37 Hence, the investor and Ei
bargain over the cost savings from using inside funds, rψi −λψi, implying that Ei’s equilibrium
continuation payoﬀ is the sum of siR0 + 1
2λψi and 1
2(rψi − λψi), which equals siR0 + 1
2rψi.
Naturally, Ej’s equilibrium continuation payoﬀ is then 1
2λψj.
Consider ﬁnally the case in which ψi ∈ {l,h} and ψj ∈ {l,h}. Suppose Ej is the last
entrepreneur to be bargained with. The payoﬀs now depend on whether the investor has already
42used up her funds for Ei. If the investor’s funds have already been used up, Ej realizes sjR0 +
1
2λψj, and the investor realizes (1 − sj)R0 + 1
2λψj from bargaining with Ej. If the investor’s
funds are still available, Ej and the investor bargain over the cost savings from using inside
funds, rψj − λψj. Consequently, Ej realizes the sum of sjR0 + 1
2λψj and 1
2(rψj − λψj),w h i c h
equals sjR0+ 1
2rψj, and the investor realizes the sum of (1 − sj)R0+ 1
2λψj and 1
2(rψj −λψj) from
bargaining with Ej, which equals (1 − sj)R0 + 1
2rψj. Consider next the negotiations between
the investor and her ﬁrst pick, Ei. If the negotiations break down, Ei realizes siR0 + 1
2λψi,
and the investor realizes the sum of (1 − si)R0 + 1
2λψi and (1 − sj)R0 + 1
2rψj. On the other
side, the surplus over which Ei and the investor bargain is rψi − λψi − 1
2(rψj − λψj). Hence,
Ei’s equilibrium continuation payoﬀ is the sum of siR0 + 1
2λψi and 1
2[rψi − λψi − 1
2(rψj − λψj)],
which equals siR0 + 1
2[rψi − 1
2(rψj − λψj)]. Naturally, Ej’s equilibrium continuation payoﬀ is
then sjR0 + 1
2rψj.
Consider next the issue who is picked to be bargained with ﬁrst. If ψi 6= ψj, we know from
the proof of Lemma 2 that the investor picks the entrepreneur with the higher interim type
ﬁrst. In contrast, if ψi = ψj, the investor picks both entrepreneurs with equal probability. We
thus have the following expected continuation payoﬀsf o rEk, an arbitrary entrepreneur: 1
8λn if
ψk = ψj6=k = n, skR0 + 1
2rψk if ψk ∈ {l,h} and ψ
j6=k = n, 1
2λψn if ψk = n and ψj6=k ∈ {l,h},
skR0 + 1
8(rψ +3λψ) if ψk = ψj6=k = ψ ∈ {l,h},s kR0 + 1
2[rh − 1
2(rl −λl)] if ψk = h and ψj6=k = l,
and skR0 + 1
2λl if ψk = l and ψj6=k = h.
Given these expected continuation payoﬀs, we can, analogous to (3), compute Ei’s expected
payoﬀ at t =0 . We obtain38
τ2qθiqθj
½
siR0 +
1
8
[rh +3 λh]
¾
+ τ2qθi
¡
1 − qθj
¢½
siR0 +
1
2
∙
rh −
1
2
[rl − λl]
¸¾
+τ2 (1 − qθi)qθj
½
siR0 +
1
2
λl
¾
+ τ2 (1 − qθi)
¡
1 − qθj
¢½
siR0 +
1
8
[rl +3 λl]
¾
+τ (1 − τ)
½
siR0 +
1
2
[rl + qθi (rh − rl)]
¾
+
¡
1+2 τ − 3τ2¢ 1
8
λn,
43which simpliﬁes to
τ
½
siR0 +
1
2
[rl + qθi (rh − rl)]
¾
+
¡
1+2 τ − 3τ2¢ 1
8
λn (41)
−
τ2
8
©
(rl − λl)
¡
3 − qθi + qθj
¢
+3 qθiqθj[rh − λh − (rl − λl)]
ª
.
Having derived Ei’s expected payoﬀ at t =0 , we next compute the responsiveness under
constrained ﬁnance when all three interim types have access to costly outside ﬁnance. Analogous
to (4), we obtain the responsiveness from (41) by setting θj = g and subtracting Ei’s expected
payoﬀ for θi = b from that for θi = g. We have
1
2
τ (qg − qb)[(rh − rl) −
τ
4
[3qg[rh − λh − (rl − λl)] − (rl − λl)]. (42)
Comparing (2) with (42), we obtain the responsiveness condition (10). ¥
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47Notes
1As Silver (1985) writes, “the need for greater amounts of venture capital, frequently not
cited in the business plan, occurs sooner than expected. Because the Murphy’s law aﬄiction
attacks most venture capital portfolios, there ar i s e sas e r i o u sn e e df o rp o r t f o l i om a n a g e m e n t . ”
2Reﬁnancing by uninformed outside investors is atb e s tm o r ec o s t l y ,a n da tw o r s tu n a v a i l a b l e :
“If the original partnership is unwilling to arrange for additional ﬁnancing, it is unlikely that
any other partnership will choose to do so; the reluctance of the original partnership is a strong
signal that the company is a poor investment” (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1995)). Consistent
with this notion, Bruno and Tyebjee (1983) ﬁnd that being denied follow-up ﬁnancing by a
previous-round venture capitalist reduces a portfolio company’s chances of obtaining ﬁnancing
from outside investors by 74 percent. See Section 4.2 for a formal analysis.
3Sahlman (1990) reports the results of one survey of venture capital investments showing that
34.5 percent of invested capital resulted in a loss, and another 30 percent resulted in returns in
the low- to middle-single digits. Less than 7 percent of invested capital resulted in payoﬀso f
more than ten times the original amount invested.
4Bartlett (1995) and Brooks (1999) provide discussions of venture partnership agreements.
5This practice may seem peculiar at ﬁrst glance, but the motive stems from limited partners’
concerns that “by adding less experienced general partners, venture capitalists may reduce the
burden on themselves” (Gompers and Lerner (1996)). Besides, it is not easy to ﬁnd skilled
venture capitalists that can be added to an existing fund: “[T]he skills needed for successful
venture capital investing are diﬃcult and time-consuming to acquire. During periods when the
... demand for venture capital has shifted, adjustments in the number of venture capitalists ...
take place very slowly” (Gompers (1995)).
486A distinct though somewhat related point is made by Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994),
who argue that assets from defaulting projects can be redeployed more eﬃciently in an internal
capital market.
7For related arguments, see Rotemberg and Saloner (1994), Gautier and Heider (2005), and
Inderst and Laux (2005). In contrast, in Stein’s (2002) model, managerial incentives to produce
information may be either weaker or stronger in a hierarchy.
8In winner-picking models à la Stein (1997), the amount of resources that can be allocated
across projects in an internal capital market is the same as under stand-alone ﬁnance. However,
headquarters has the authority to redistribute assets from “losers” to “winners,” while stand-
alone ﬁnanciers lack this authority. Hence, headquarters has advantages but no disadvantages.
In contrast, in our model, constrained and unconstrained investors have the same authority
to reallocate resources, but constrained investors have fewer resources available. Hence, in
allocating resources, constrained investors have disadvantages but no advantages.
9W h i l ei ti sn a t u r a lt ot h i n ko fI2 as ﬁnancial capital, it may alternatively represent human
capital on the part of the investor, who must expend time and resources to coach the project.
10That R0 does not depend on the project’s interim type simpliﬁes the analysis, but is not
crucial.
11By managing more than two projects–the optimal span of the investor’s portfolio in our
model–the investor would spread herself too thin in the projects’ critical start-up phase.
12Suppose there is a potentially large pool of such ﬂy-by-night operators–ex ante indis-
tinguishable from genuine entrepreneurs–who have projects generating a certain zero payoﬀ.
Knowing that they will receive a guaranteed payment, all of those operators would apply for ﬁ-
nancing, in which case the investor’s expected proﬁt would quickly become negative. In contrast,
under a sharing rule, the ﬂy-by-night operators have nothing to gain from applying. Indeed, if
49there is an epsilon cost, they will strictly prefer not to apply.
13Leaving the decision rights with regard to the reﬁnancing decision with the investor is
optimal given our ﬂy-by-night operator assumption. If the entrepreneur had decision rights, a
fraudulent entrepreneur could extract a bribe at t =1by forcing the investor to invest I2 at
the reﬁnancing stage, which is a negative NPV undertaking given that projects by ﬂy-by-night
operators generate a certain zero payoﬀ. The two sides will thus strike a deal whereby the
operator cedes his decision rights to the investor in return for a bribe. Anticipating this bribe,
all operators would apply for ﬁnancing.
14Gompers (1995) writes: “Tangible assets may be easy to monitor without formal evaluation.
A venture capitalist can tell if a machine is still bolted to the ﬂoor. ... Conversations with
practitioners, however, indicate that they normally make continuation decisions when a new
ﬁnancing round occurs. Venture capitalists evaluate a ﬁrm based on performance progress, not
whether a machine is still bolted down.”
15Modeling bargaining frictions by a risk of breakdown is standard. In contrast to the case
in which bargaining frictions take the form of delay, the risk of breakdown ensures that the
two parties’ outside options are always relevant. That bilateral bargaining with a risk of break-
down, but not bargaining with delay, can support the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution with
threatpoints, is shown in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986).
16As is standard in the literature, we consider the limit as bargaining frictions go to zero, i.e.,
δ → 0. In the limit, it is irrelevant who makes the ﬁrst oﬀer. See the proof of Lemma 1 for
details.
17Besides, the notion that the investor can extract the entire surplus at t =1does not square
with our assumption that the entrepreneur is essential to continue the project.
18This is provided both entrepreneurs are still present, i.e., there is no breakdown.
5019If entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between θ = b and θ = g, we assume without loss of generality
that they choose θ = b. Note that if the responsiveness condition (5) holds, there exists always
a nonempty set of B values that satisfy (6).
20To be precise, Proposition 2 does not require that (5) and (6) hold for all τ>0.T h et w o
conditions only need to hold for suﬃciently large success probabilities for which constrained
ﬁnance is viable.
21It is easy to construct a numerical example. If qb =1 /4,q g =1 /2,r l =7 ,r h =1 1 ,R 0 =8 ,
and B =1 /2, then (5) and (6) hold for all τ>0. Given the expressions for the investor’s and
entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀs derived in the Appendix, it can be easily veriﬁed that b τ =1 /8,
while πI
U and πI
C intersect at τ =1 /2, implying that case i) of Proposition 2 holds if I1 ≥ 6,
and case ii) holds if I1 < 6. For example, when I1 =1 , the project is not viable if τ<0.0805,
constrained ﬁnance is chosen if 0.0805 ≤ τ ≤ 1/8, and unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen if τ>1/8.
22The derivation of b τ and the entrepreneur’s payoﬀs under constrained and unconstrained
ﬁnance are found in the proof of Proposition 2, which also shows that ˆ τ lies to the left of the
intersection of πI
U and πI
C as depicted in Figure 2.
23Moreover, a decrease in qb makes it more likely that case ii) in Proposition 2 applies, for
two reasons: The set of admissible B values satisfying (6) becomes larger, and the fact that πI
U
shifts to the right implies that the critical investment cost above which case i) applies is shifted
upwards.
24Straightforward calculations show that the likelihood that a project is rejected at the reﬁ-
nancing stage under constrained ﬁnance is 1 − τ + 1
2τ2.
25P r e c i s e l y ,i tm u s th o l dt h a tpn <I 2/R.
26In a two-payoﬀ model, with one payoﬀ being R>0 and the other payoﬀ being zero, any
feasible ﬁnancial contract must necessarily involve a positive repayment if the payoﬀ is R.
5127The conditions for an equilibrium in which all three interim types have access to costly
outside ﬁnance, and the one in which only interim types ψ ∈ {n,h} have access to costly outside
ﬁnance, are not mutually exclusive. It is easy to ﬁnd values of τ for which both equilibria exist
(in addition to the equilibrium in which the market for outside ﬁnance shuts down, which always
exists).
28One can show that in the limit as δ → 0, the same outcome would obtain if the investor ran-
domizes in every round rather than staying with her ﬁrst pick. The analysis involves somewhat
longer equations, though.
29To prove that the investor’s strategy is optimal, it suﬃces to consider one-stage deviations.
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1992), Theorem 4.2.
30Strictly speaking, (28) and (29) are only meaningful for values of τ for which the project
is viable, i.e., values for which (26) and (27) are non-negative. This rules out τ =0 .H o w e v e r ,
g i v e nt h a ta l lf u n c t i o n si nq u e s t i o na r es t r i c t l yi ncreasing and either linear or strictly concave,
considering the functions’ behavior at τ =0tells us their behavior relative to each other for
larger, admissible values of τ.
31Dividing through by (rh − rl) and rearranging, we obtain 2(qg − qb) − q2
g < rl
rh−rl, which
holds by (5).
32The left-hand side corresponds to (1) with θi = b and si = sU,a n dt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d e
corresponds to (3) with θi = b, θj = g, and si = sC.
33The left-hand side corresponds to (3) with θi = θj = g and si = sC, and the right-hand side
corresponds to (1) with θi = g and si = sU.
34If both projects have interim type ψ = n, it is optimal for the insiders to present only one
project to outside investors as the latter would otherwise rationally conclude that both projects
are unsuccessful.
5235If one project has interim type ψ = h and the other has interim type ψ = l, it is optimal for
the insiders to ﬁnance the former internally and to present the latter to outside investors.
36Recall that pn is assumed to be small. If, e.g., pn is close to pl, (38) holds trivially for all
τ ≥ 0.
37We assume that if the negotiations with Ei over using inside funds break down, the investor
and Ei can still negotiate over the surplus realized from using costly outside funds. An alternative
assumption would be that the breakdown is “complete” in the sense that any negotiations with
Ei are impossible. While the precise deﬁnition of a breakdown of negotiations aﬀects the form
of the responsiveness condition derived below, our qualitative results do not hinge on it.
38Recall the joint probabilities for interim types (ψi,ψj) stated in the proof of Lemma 2.
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Figure 1: Summary of Project Technology.
Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2.
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